Introduction
The most important problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanicspossibly the only important problem-is the so-called measurement problem: the inconsistency between the unitary evolution described by the Schrödinger equation and the discontinuous, non-unitary evolution given by the von Neumann projection postulate. In standard QM, the wavefunction of a quantum system evolves continuously according to the Schrödinger equation,
whereĤ is a Hamiltonian operator and |ψ the state of the system at the current time t. When the system is measured, however, by an external measuring device, the state jumps instantaneously to a new state
with probability p k = ψ|P k |ψ , where the {P k } are a complete set of orthogonal projection operators. The choice of projections depends on the quantity being measured. It is clear that these two evolution laws are quite different. Presumably the difference arises because of the influence of the external measuring device. But any such device must itself be made of atoms and other components which are themselves subject to quantum laws. If we include the measuring device together with the system as a larger, joint system, this larger system will no longer obey the von Neumann projection rule; instead, it will evolve into a superposition of all possible measurement results, reminiscent of the famous Schrödinger's cat paradox.
We can attempt to go beyond this by having an observer look at the measuring device; this itself might count as a measurement, which will "collapse" the wavefunction. But the observer, too, is composed of atoms and molecules which obey quantum laws. We seem to be caught in an infinite regress.
One proposal to get out of this regress is the "decoherence" program of Zurek, Joos and Zeh, and others 1 . Any macroscopic system (like a measuring device) must interact with many microscopic degrees of freedom in its environment: stray photons and molecules of gas which bounce off of it, the atoms in the floor beneath, etc. These extra degrees of freedom become correlated with the state of the macroscopic system, destroying the possibility of macroscopically distinct states interfering with each other. In essence, they continuously perform "measurements" on all macroscopic systems with which they interact. This is an important insight, and is unarguably a real effect: the experimental evidence for decoherence is overwhelming. But as a solution for the measurement problem it leaves many people dissatisfied. If we describe the state of the system alone, tracing out the environment, decoherence can indeed explain how an initially pure state |ψ can evolve into a mixed state
which looks like a probabilistic mixture of different measurement outcomes |ψ k with probabilities p k , just as in the measurement scheme described above. But critics complain that there is still an unexplained step between getting such a density matrix ρ and getting a single outcome |ψ k . Moreover, these same critics complain that even getting this density matrix depends crucially on making the subjective distinction between system and environment, and on tracing out the environment degrees of freedom. If we describe the state of system and environment together, it remains pure, and obeys Schrödinger's equation at all times. What is missing is an explanation of our subjective experience, in which a single event occurs with some probability.
In order to explain this experience, we need to have some idea of what a probability is. Common explanations in terms of the frequencies of repeated events are unsatisfactory; most events are not repeated exactly, and even if they are, for a finite number of repetitions it is always possible that the observed frequencies will be very different from those that would be predicted a priori.
A more satisfactory definition is that of the Bayesians: the probability of an outcome is a measure of our certainty as to whether that outcome will occur. This sounds quite subjective, but in a sense it is not. Given the same prior information, any two rational beings should assign the same probabilities to the same outcomes 2 . By combining this notion of subjective probabilities with a formulation of quantum mechanics which enables a discussion of whether or not events occur, it is possible to form an internally consistent description of quantum mechanics without any special measurement postulate. This formulation explains both the usual freedom of quantum mechanics to describe systems in terms of any choice of observables, including macroscopic superpositions, and our subjective experience in which only a single macroscopic state occurs. In the following notes I develop this argument using the consistent histories formalism of quantum mechanics 3, 4, 5 . I think any argument along these lines will arrive at a similar conclusion (including the fact that the histories which describe our possible experiences form a consistent set). However, I do not claim that this is the only way in which this formalism may be consistently interpreted.
The decoherent histories formalism has been attacked as 'ambiguous' because it admits multiple incompatible descriptions of the same quantum system 6 . I will argue in this paper that this criticism is misguided, and based on a confusion between descriptions and the things they describe. We must immediately understand two important points. First, the 'incompatibility' between different descriptions in no way implies that they contradict each other, but is a technical term indicating that they cannot be combined into a single, more fine-grained description. This is unintuitive-in classical physics, such a combination is always possible. But it is not inherently paradoxical.
Second, this ambiguity of description is a freedom we enjoy as theorists; but it does not imply any ambiguity in the answer of unambiguous questions. Given a particular physical system and a particular question about it, any consistent description which addresses this question will given exactly the same answer. In particular, we human beings are physical systems before we are theorists; and while we may entertain many possible descriptions of the world in our minds, we have no choice about what we actually experience.
Because I don't wish to consider the philosophical problem of explaining our conscious experience, which may indeed be beyond the scope of physics, the protagonist in these notes will be a robot, equipped with a computer brain and memory and detectors which serve as its senses. This is similar to Jaynes's 2 use of a robot to emphasize that any rational being will assign the same probabilities given the same prior information.
Finally, let me clarify that 'observers' are in no way necessary for the understanding of quantum mechanics. I treat the robot in this paper solely as a model for understanding how, in principle, we might use quantum mechanics to unambiguously predict our own subjective experience. In practice, we usually use quantum mechanics to describe systems without observers.
Consistent histories and branching wavefunctions
The formalism of consistent histories is well known, so we reprise it only briefly here. Suppose that a closed quantum system is initially in a state |ψ 0 . It is then possible to choose a succession of times t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t N , and at each time specify an exhaustive set of alternatives at each time t i , represented mathematically by a set of orthogonal projectionsP i αi which give a decomposition of the identity:
A history then consists of an alternative at each time. The history operator is definedĈ
for all pairs of histories α and α ′ . If this is satisfied, then the diagonal terms p(α) can be interpreted as the probabilities of the histories α, and these probabilities satisfy the usual probability sum rule.
Such a set of histories forms a branching structure. At time t 0 we know only the initial state of the universe; at time t 1 we split this into a number of different alternatives; each of these is in turn split at time t 2 , and so forth. Much has been made of this branching process, with some arguing that a physical mechanism must exist to select one branch and discard the others. Unfortunately, there is no single, unique consistent set of histories. Any set which obeys the consistency criterion (6) is as valid a choice as any other. The theory is silent on this point, a fact which has sometimes been cited as a fatal flaw.
Actually, there is a simple way of understanding this multiplicity of consistent sets in terms familiar from standard quantum mechanics, by appreciating that specifying a consistent set of histories is the same as resolving the evolving wavefunction into orthogonal components at all times. This resolution into components has the same branching structure as the histories: if there are n 1 alternatives at time t 1 , n 2 at t 2 and so forth, then at times t < t 1 there is only one component; at t 1 < t < t 2 there are n 1 components; at t 2 < t < t 3 there are n 1 n 2 components, and so forth. The consistency criterion ensures that the components are, in fact, orthogonal.
If t is between t j and t j+1 then the wavefunction can be written
Because Hamiltonian evolution preserves orthogonality, if we have chosen a particular resolution of the wavefunction into orthogonal components we can (if we like) select a single component, renormalize it, and follow its evolution without having to worry about any of the others. It is this fact which enforces obedience to the probability sum rules. Since any set of orthogonal components can, in standard quantum mechanics, be considered eigenstates of an observable, an appropriate series of measurements would pick out exactly one final component, with a probability equal to the probability of the history. But in consistent histories it is unnecessary (and meaningless) to invoke a measuring device outside the system. Thus, we see that the sort of intuitive picture often invoked in discussions of 'Many-Worlds,' in which the wavefunction repeatedly branches, makes sense when considered in the context of consistent histories. It is not clear, however, that it makes sense to talk of these branches all being real; the reality of something with which one can never interact seems more a question for philosophy than physics.
There is one major caveat here. There is by no means only a single way of resolving the wavefunction into orthogonal components. Indeed, there is an infinite number of ways, corresponding to the infinitude of consistent sets. On the level of orthogonal components, this is little more than the statement that many bases can be chosen for each branch.
This multiplicity of descriptions implies no physical inconsistency; we are, in a sense, visualizing the universe from the outside, and can do so in any way that we choose. However, that is not to say that there is no physical significance attached to particular descriptions, or choices of set. If one wishes to discuss, for example, the value of a particular physical variable, it only makes sense to do so in the context of histories which assign it a value. This should be completely obvious, but has given rise to great confusion.
Thus, there seem to be two ways of looking at consistent histories. From the outside, it seems to be a decomposition of a unitarily evolving wavefunction into numerous coexisting components. But in the context of a single consistent set, one might equally well think of it as a stochastic model in which one history occurs with a given probability, and the others represent only potential outcomes. I will argue in this paper that it is impossible for an observer inside a closed 'universe' to distinguish between these two pictures, provided only that we assume the weights assigned to single histories correspond to subjective probabilities of the observer.
Bayesian probabilities
From the preceding discussion it is clear that probabilities, whatever they are, must arise at the level of the branching. However, given that there are many different consistent sets, there are many ways in which this branching could be considered to occur. What does it mean, then, to assign probabilities to these branches?
A good step towards answering this question is to ask what it means to assign probabilities to alternatives in classical physics. Surprisingly, there is still considerable controversy on this point. For years there has been an ongoing debate between the frequentist and Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. I sketch them both, briefly.
In the frequentist picture, the probability of a given result is the frequency with which that result occurs over a large number of repeated trials. This has a certain intuitive appeal, and lends itself well to describing some problems, such as the odds of rolling various numbers with dice.
Unfortunately, as a rigorous basis for probabilities the frequentist description has serious flaws. What does it mean to say that the probability is the frequency over many trials? How many trials? If it is a finite number, there will always be some cases in which the frequencies deviate markedly from the underlying probabilities. How do we deal with those cases? One can't simply dismiss them as improbable; probability is what we are trying to define! A related problem is that the frequentist approach is mute in assigning probabilities to single events. Looking at repeated trials makes sense when betting on dice, but not when betting on horse-races or football games; no two races or games will ever be exactly alike. But that doesn't stop the bookmakers from setting odds.
The Bayesian interpretation is quite different. In this picture, a probability is always subjective, in the sense that it reflects the uncertainty of a rational agent with incomplete information. This agent need not be "intelligent;" it need only be able to reason consistently according to fixed rules. An appropriately programmed computer would be a perfectly good rational agent. Probabilities are subjective, in that they depend on the information possessed by the agent, but they are objective in that any two agents given the same information would assign exactly the same probabilities, as long as both agents were rational.
In the Bayesian interpretation all probabilities are a result of imperfect information, and therefore it makes as much sense to assign probabilities to single events as to long sequences. And what is more, the correspondence between frequencies and probabilities now becomes clear: given the probability for a single trial, one can deduce the probabilities that different frequencies will be observed in repeated trials (as long as these trials are independent). As the number of trials increases, it becomes less and less probable that the frequency will deviate significantly from the single-time probability.
In this way, frequencies remain important. From the outcome of a single event, a rational agent has little way of assessing how good its a priori probabilities were. By examining the outcomes of many events, however, the agent can either gain confidence in its assessment, or else improve it in light of experience. This is the Bayesian picture for a classical world. It has had great success in unifying the results of probability theory within a single, consistent framework. But how must it be changed to deal with a fundamentally quantum world?
The robot
The first question to be answered is what exactly is a rational agent? A rational agent is simply a physical system which is capable of processing information according to definite rules: in short, a computer. Following E.T. Jaynes, we term this agent 'The Robot' 2 . Since we imagine our robot to be something which could (at least in principle) exist, we model it as a finite automaton. Such a device has a finite number of possible internal states, and a finite number of possible inputs. At each stage in its computation it receives a single input value, and based on its current state and the value of the input it evolves deterministically to a new state.
The robot begins with a certain amount of prior information. This is contained both in its programming (i.e., the rules by which it changes states) and its initial state. We assume that it has been programmed to reason consistently, and is therefore rational in our limited sense.
The internal state of the robot is a valid observable, so we can choose basis states which are eigenstates of this observable. We label these basis states |B n , whereB is the observable and B n indicates that the robot is in its nth internal state.
This observableB is highly coarse-grained. The robot will undoubtedly contain many more internal degrees of freedom which are more or less irrelevant for our purposes. We will call these degrees of freedom the 'environment of the robot' and label them b. Thus a complete state of the robot could be expressed in a basis |B n , b . This is not sufficient to describe the functioning of the robot. It must also receive data from the outside world. This data will, in general, be far from a complete description of the world. Rather, we assume that the robot's senses are limited, so that it can only get a very coarse-grained picture. LetÂ be the observable which the robot has access to. For instance,Â might be the output from a measuring device, or a group of measuring devices. We call any other degrees of freedom which are irrelevant to the value ofÂ 'the environment of A,' and label them a. Thus, a state of the robot, its input data, and their respective environments can be expressed in the basis |A m , a, B n , b .
Finally, there may be other degrees of freedom in the universe to which the robot has no direct access, but which do affect the dynamics ofÂ. We will lump these together under the labelQ, with eigenvalues Q l . Note that there may be more than one reasonable choice ofQ; for example, if the external system were a spin-1/2 particle one might choose to express the spin in the x basis, the y basis, or any other direction. Picking one descriptionQ for the present, a complete state can now be written
We will usually suppress the environment labels a, b. They can be important, however, in that they allow the dynamics of A and B to be irreversible and decoherent.
In describing the dynamics of the robot and its world, we let time be discrete, each time corresponding to a single tick of the robot's internal clock. At each step, the robot will change from its current state to one of N possible successor states, depending on which if its N possible values the observableÂ assumes. The state of the robot after j steps then depends on its initial value and the succession of values A i that it observes:
We assume that the robot starts in a special initial state, ready to solve a problem. Note that this dependence on all previous values of A i means that the robot "remembers" what values ofÂ it has already seen.Â will generally have dynamics of its own, which for the moment we will assume are independent of B . (Later we will allow the robot to act on the information it acquires.) In a single time step A m goes to some new value A m+1 . The quantum dynamics is almost exactly the same. Neglecting, for the moment, the existence of any significant variablesQ, evolution in time is given by a unitary operatorÛ which effectŝ
To be truly consistent, we should include the environment degrees of freedom as well:
Histories of the robot
We are now in a position to ask what our robot 'sees' in a given situation. The obvious way to do this is to choose for our alternatives projections onto the internal state of the robotP Bn . Note that we need not project onto the internal state of the robot alone. We can, if we like, project onto the values of the observableÂ as well, or even include portions of the environments a and b and possibleQ as well, provided that consistency is not violated. The possible experiences of the robot do not pick out a unique consistent sets, but rather a large family of such sets, each a fine-graining of the coarsest description which includes projections on the internal state of the robot and nothing else. Some of these fine-grainings may be incompatible with each other, but they are all compatible with this coarsest set. The important point is that histories incompatible with the observableB tell us nothing about what the robot 'sees' and 'thinks. ' BecauseÂ andB are perfectly correlated, histories ofÂ,B, andÂ andB will all have the same probabilities. Thus, it doesn't matter whether we take the worm's-eye-view inside the robot's brain, or the 'objective' picture of what it considers is going on in the world outside. The predictions in either case are the same. This, by the way, is a good place to point out that this robot is not intended to fill a role similar to that filled by 'The Observer' in standard quantum mechanics. There is no mystical significance to the presence of a rational agent. It is simply another physical system, and obeys exactly the same laws as any other physical system. I will say more about invoking imaginary 'Observers' in a later section.
Predicting the outcome of an experiment
Suppose that the robot is programmed to be a gambling machine, betting on the outcome of a quantum measurement. The initial state is
The external system is in a superposition of two eigenstates Q 1 and Q 2 of some observableQ; for instance, it might be a spin-1/2 particle. The robot has the following initial information: (1) it knows the rules of quantum mechanics, (2) it knows the initial state of the external system, and (3) it has been offered some odds O on the outcome of a measurement ofQ. The variableÂ gives the position of the pointer on a measuring device.
The robot must decide whether or not the odds it has been offered are fair. If they are, it will bet $1 on the outcome Q 1 ; if not, it will bet nothing. If the outcome is Q 1 , the robot wins $O. If it is Q 2 , it loses a dollar. The robot's expected winnings are O|α| 2 − |β| 2 . Rationally, the robot should only accept the bet if |β| 2 /|α| 2 ≤ O. With this strategy, it can never lose money on average.
In another way of looking at this, however, it seems like the robot always both wins and loses. After all, if we think of a set of histories as a branching wavefunction, after the measurement both components are present with probability 1. The evolution is, in fact, completely deterministic. This is where it is important to bear in mind that the probabilities that matter to the robot are subjective probabilities. A mythical 'outside observer' might see both outcomes; but there is no such observer. The only observers are inside the system, and an observer in a given branch can only see the events within that branch. The winning and losing robots can never interact or be aware of each other in any way.
An analogy due to Simon Saunders is helpful in thinking about this 7 . (Interestingly enough, almost exactly the same idea was used by two science fiction authors, Frederick Pohl and Jack Williamson, in a pair of novels they wrote together 8 .) Suppose that we have a (classical) perfect copying machine. Any object placed in it is exactly duplicated, without itself being changed in any way.
Suppose the technicians approach our robot, which we will call A, and ask it to allow them to duplicate it. They assure the robot that it will notice nothing at all. The robot agrees, enters the copying machine, and instantaneously a new robot is produced, called B. Suppose that B appears on a distant planet, so that B and A can never compare notes. Just as the technicians said, A doesn't feel a thing, and goes on its merry way.
B's experience, however, is quite different. It, too, remembers being assured by the technicians that it would feel nothing; but despite their assurances it now finds itself on a distant planet. To B, the device seems less like a copy machine, and more like an instant transportation device. If once again asked to be duplicated, B will undoubtedly think of things quite differently. Instead of walking in and walking out unchanged, it will have a 50/50 subjective probability of remaining behind or being transported.
The situation of the robot in a quantum universe is quite similar. The wave function may branch into a superposition of many robots making different observations, but each one perceives only its own branch. Thus, in making a decision before the branch occurs, the robot should rationally try to maximize the benefits of all the copies. This is exactly the same as estimating the subjective probabilities of each branch.
Only one requirement is necessary for this identification to be complete: that the 'weights' of the different branches equal the subjective probabilities of rational agents in those branches. This could be considered an axiom of consistent histories, but in fact it may follow directly from the deeper structure of quantum theory. Gleason's theorem seems to argue that such an identification is essentially inevitable.
Estimating the wavefunction-quantum coin tossing
This situation is parallel to the above case, but differs in important respects. Suppose now that the external degrees of freedom consist of N identical twolevel systems in exactly the same initial state, and that these will be measured successively by the measuring device with output valueÂ. This time the robot knows the rules of quantum mechanics and it knows that all the external systems are in the same state, but does not know what that state is. Its task is to estimate the initial state from the results of N measurements.
Suppose the initial state is
that is, there are prepared N identical copies of the microscopic system, each in the same initial state, the output of the measuring device is in its initial (null) state, and the robot is in the starting state. At each subsequent time, the measuring device measures one of the microscopic systems and produces an output |A 1 or |A 2 ; the robot, in turn, observes the output, and undergoes a transition to a new state. This state depends on all of the observations up to that time, and includes an estimate of the microscopic state with an attached confidence limit. We can label the internal state of the robot |B i1i2...in after n time steps, with each of the i 1 . . . i n being either 1 or 2. Thus, after n steps the state of the whole system is
where n 1 is the number of i 1 . . . i n equal to 1, and N − n of the microscopic systems remain in the initial state. Clearly projections onto the state ofÂ at each time form a consistent set of histories, as do projections onB, orÂ andB. There will clearly be certain histories in which the robot gets a very distorted estimate of the initial state. For instance, in the history where the robot measures Q 1 every time, it will conclude with high confidence that the state is very close to |α| = 1. But if |α| < 1, the probability of this happening is only |α| 2N . In most histories, the robot gets a reasonably accurate picture.
The scheme as described actually only lets the robot estimate the values of |α| 2 and |β| 2 , without their relative phase. In a more sophisticated experiment, the robot might have access to three measuring devices, measuring the x, y, and z axes, and would use 1/3 of the prepared systems in each detector; or might even allocate systems to different detectors based on its current estimates of its uncertainty. But the essential situation is unchanged.
Quantum vs. classical uncertainties
The two cases described above typify the difference between quantum and classical probabilities. In the first case, the robot had total knowledge of the initial state. Its uncertainty was completely due to the inherent indeterminism of quantum systems. In the second case, its uncertainties were due to its imperfect information, and hence were essentially classical in nature.
This illustrates the remarkable characteristic of quantum probabilities: even maximal information in incomplete, in the sense that it does not allow the robot to predict the outcome with certainty. Consider the following two experiments. In the first, each of the N microscopic systems is prepared in the same state α|Q 1 + β|Q 2 . In the second, |α| 2 N of the systems are prepared in state |Q 1 while |β| 2 N of the systems are prepared in state |Q 2 , distributed randomly. If only allowed to measure Q 1 vs. Q 2 the robot is unable to distinguish these two situations, but given the freedom to measure any linear combination of the two it can quickly tell them apart. Indeed, if the robot chooses to measure the α|Q 1 + β|Q 2 axis, in the first case it will always get the same result. For this particular experiment, maximal information translates into a deterministic outcome. But in general it does not.
Within the context of the lab, the robot has considerable freedom of choice as to how it will prepare and measure microscopic systems. But in the world as a whole it does not, and there is no guarantee that the variables with which its senses are correlated will correspond to the exact state of the universe. Therefore, in general, the robot will perceive a probabilistic universe, with unavoidable uncertainties.
Given this fact, an interesting question becomes not why is there so much apparent randomness in the universe, but why is there so little? Why do deterministic classical laws hold with such good precision on the macroscopic level? The answer to this question is still not fully understood. But it seems clear from our experience that certain variables (highly coarse-grained ones, for the most part) are much more predictable than others; and therefore, a well-informed and programmed robot can make much better judgments about their behavior than it could about general quantum variables. It is this fact, indeed, that underlies the assumption that the robot itself can be described in quasiclassical terms. We will briefly examine this question below.
Discovering quantum theory
We have, up to this point, assumed that the robot's programming included a knowledge of the laws of quantum mechanics. But suppose we wished for the robot to discover those laws in the first place. How might it set about the task?
Of course, characterizing the entire process of scientific research and discovery is far beyond our abilities; the real discovery of quantum mechanics was the result of many people working on many different problems. But we can consider a 'baby' version of this problem. Suppose, once again, the robot is provided with N microscopic systems, and the robot must decide between two physical pictures. Either the state is a ray in a two-dimensional Hilbert space α|Q 1 + β|Q 2 , or it is a classical spin pointing in a random direction, with definite probabilities p x , p y , and p z of the having positive spin components S x , S y , and S z . The robot can measure spins along either the x or z directions, and can perform repeated measurements on the same spin.
One can sketch out the form of an experiment. Both pictures give identical predictions for single spin measurements x or z, or pairs of spin measurements xx, zz, xz or zx. Their predictions differ, however, for three measurements xzx or zxz. In the classical picture, the first and last measurements should always give identical results, while in the quantum picture they should not.
We now let the robot go, and it performs its N measurements. In the vast majority of cases, it will correctly conclude that the quantum description is better than the classical. There is a chance, however, of 1/2 N that the experimental outcome will exactly match the classical prediction. In that case, the robot will conclude, based on its available information, that the classical description is much more likely than the quantum.
In any probabilistic theory there is always a possibility that, purely by chance, one may reach the wrong conclusion from a correct experiment. In medical testing, where small samples are the rule, this in fact happens all the time. In physics, we rarely spend much time worrying about the possibility. After all, the probability of it occurring is almost unimaginably small for a typical experiment. But in enumerating all possible histories, there will always be some, of low probability, in which highly atypical things happen. It should be clearly understood that the existence of such possible histories in no way violates either the laws of physics or of common sense.
Robots as canonical observers
I have argued, I hope convincingly, that quantum mechanics (and decoherent histories in particular) can describe the experiences of observers without ambiguity. However, an extreme subjectivist might now charge that we have undermined the ability of quantum mechanics to describe a system without observers. The formalism can easily be applied to such systems, to calculate a consistent set of histories with appropriate probabilities. But if we insist that probabilities are meaningful only as the subjective judgments of a rational agent, what do the probabilities mean if there are no rational agents around? Do they mean anything at all?
Probably very few people, if any, would take such an extreme view. It is the probabilistic equivalent of asserting that a tree falling in a forest with no one around not only makes no sound, but doesn't even exist. However, even without going to such an extreme, one might still ask for an interpretation of the probabilities we calculate.
One way of answering this question is to invoke an imaginary 'canonical observer,' who passively observes which set of events occurs, and whose subjective probabilities would match those of the particular consistent set we are using. An important property of consistent sets is that it is always possible, in principle, to add such an observer to the system without altering the predicted probabilities of the different histories. Indeed, it is possible to derive the consistency criterion from this requirement. Such an observer would be similar to the canonical observers, each equipped with a clock and meter stick, which are often invoked in General Relativity to explain the meaning of the metric. These relativistic observers are assumed to be too small to distort the solution of Einstein's equations. Similarly, the quantum observers avoid interfering with the probabilities by restricting themselves to consistent sets.
The 'canonical observers' could be one or more of our robots, carefully tailored to the particular decoherent set we are using. But the most important thing to remember is that these are imaginary observers. We do not insist when doing a calculation in General Relativity that it only makes sense if space is filled with tiny people carrying clocks and meter sticks. Similarly, in quantum mechanics it is perfectly sensible to create descriptions in which nothing resembling a measurement or an observer is present.
Why quasiclassical variables? The parable of the hourglass
Quasiclassical variables are the familiar variables of the classical world: coarsegrained center of mass positions and momenta of macroscopic objects, averaged field strengths in small cells in space, and so forth. These are the variables which most simply describe us as physical systems, as well as what we observe in the world around us.
The question is, why should this be so? Within decoherent histories there are an infinity of consistent sets, corresponding to an infinity of possible descriptions, almost none of which are anything like quasiclassical. What is it about the quasiclassical description which is special? Or is there nothing special about it at all, and we could have evolved to use a very different decomposition of the wavefunction?
While the answer to this question is not known, it has been speculated that what makes the quasiclassical description is its predictability. Quasiclassical variables give a highly coarse-grained description which approximately obeys a closed set of deterministic equations. Highly nonclassical descriptions, such as descriptions in terms of macroscopic superpositions, do not.
The most famous example of a macroscopic superposition is Schrödinger's cat. Sealed in a box with a vial of poison, whose release is controlled by the decay of a single atom, the cat evolves into an equally-weighted superposition of being alive and dead: |ψ = |live, undecayed → |ψ ′ = 1 √ 2 (|live, undecayed + |dead, decayed ) .
(15) If we describe this system in the decoherence formalism, we could choose a set which includes projectors |ψ ψ| and |ψ ′ ψ ′ | at the initial and final times. Such a description is highly nonclassical, but obviously consistent (since |ψ ′ is just the unitarily evolved successor to |ψ ). Or we could choose a quasiclassical description, with projectorsP live ,P dead at both the initial and final times. Why should we choose one rather than the other?
One observation which we should make is that live vs. dead is a very coarse-grained trait. The projectorsP live andP dead correspond to very large subspaces of the Hilbert space of the cat. The quasiclassical description is thus robust under perturbations of the initial state, the dynamics, and the times of the projections. The unitary description is not.
The time evolution of the quasiclassical description is also far simpler. In the case of Schrödinger's cat, it begins by being alive; if we wait long enough (and the humane society doesn't intervene) the cat will become dead, and remain dead thereafter. The description in terms of macroscopic superpositions, by contrast, will change constantly and rapidly, exhibiting extremely complicated dynamics.
The physics of live and dead cats is a bit too complicated for easy analysis, but the essential point can be captured by a classical analogy. Consider an hourglass, which begins with all the sand in the upper half. After approximately an hour, all the sand will have dropped to the lower half. We could try to describe this system by keeping track of the position, velocity and orientation of every grain of sand, but this is far too complicated to carry out in practice. Instead, we might consider some kind of coarse-grained description of the hourglass.
Here are two such coarse-grainings, which are superficially similar.
f (t) = 1 if more sand on top at time t; 0 otherwise. g(t) = 1 if odd number of grains on top at time t; 0 otherwise. .
Both variables are defined at all times, and give exactly one bit of information about the state of the hourglass. But f (t) gives a simple description with a simple time-evolution, which is robust under perturbations of the initial state; the exact time of the transition from 1 to 0 may vary slightly, but the essentials of the description are unchanged. By contrast, g(t) exhibits very complicated behavior, which evolves unpredictably on a much shorter timescale than f (t), and which is highly sensitive to the exact initial state of the sand. Which description is simpler and more stable? Which is more useful? It is not hard to see that quasiclassical histories are more like f (t), and histories of macroscopic superpositions are more like g(t).
